Journal of Landscape Architecture ISSN: 1862-6033 (Print) 2164-604X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjla20 Aesthetic creation theory and landscape architecture Rudi van Etteger, Ian H. Thompson & Vera Vicenzotti To cite this article: Rudi van Etteger, Ian H. Thompson & Vera Vicenzotti (2016) Aesthetic creation theory and landscape architecture, Journal of Landscape Architecture, 11:1, 80-91, DOI: 10.1080/18626033.2016.1144688 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/18626033.2016.1144688 © 2016 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis Published online: 01 Feb 2016. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 59 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjla20 Download by: [Vera Vicenzotti] Date: 25 February 2016, At: 11:37 Aesthetic creation theory and landscape architecture Downloaded by [Vera Vicenzotti] at 11:37 25 February 2016 Rudi van Etteger, Wageningen University and Research Centre, The Netherlands Ian H. Thompson, Newcastle University, United Kingdom Vera Vicenzotti, SLU Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Alnarp, Sweden Abstract In recent decades the landscape architectural discourse has tended to es- ‘Landscape architecture is […] a blend of science and art, vision and thought. chew ideas of aesthetics while focusing instead on notions of functional It is a creative profession skilled in strategic planning, delivery and manand sustainable design. We offer the view that Aesthetic Creation Theory, agement. Landscape architects bring knowledge of natural sciences, enviwhose principal exponent is the philosopher Nick Zangwill, has the poten- ronmental law and planning policy. […] And they create delight with beautial to redress this imbalance by interpreting landscape architecture as ‘art’. tiful designs, protecting and enhancing our most cherished landscapes and Zangwill’s account of ‘art’ differs, however, from many other definitions townscapes’ (Landscape Institute 2012: 1). found in philosophical aesthetics: it holds that works of art have aesthetic functions that are essential to them, but also allows that they have other, Redressing an imbalance in landscape architectural theory non-aesthetic functions, for example practical or ecological ones. It thus Searching for a contemporary definition of landscape architecture, this text removes the strict distinction between fine art and the useful arts. After by the Landscape Institute is rare in that it mentions art, vision, creativintroducing Zangwill’s theory, we discuss some rival theories of art and ity, delight, and beauty. Many other definitions avoid these words, such then explore the virtues of Aesthetic Creation Theory for the theory, prac- as the one offered by the International Federation of Landscape Architects tice, and pedagogy of landscape architecture. (2003). This is symptomatic: in an age which values science and rationality, landscape architectural discourse has tended to eschew ideas of aesthetics Aesthetic Creation Theory / criticism / landscape architecture / in favour of notions of functional and sustainable design. This seems to philosophical aesthetics / theory apply particularly to some influential movements in North America and Europe, such as Landscape Urbanism (for example, Waldheim 2006; cp. Herrington 2010; Thompson 2012). These positivistic and technocratic tendencies have been criticized by some authors within the discipline_criticism that has gained momentum in recent years (Dee 2012; Gustavsson 2012; Herrington 2008; 2010; 2011; Meyer 2008; Treib 2011). Sharing the concern that landscape architecture theory has fallen seriously out of balance, and that this does not serve the discipline well (Hunt 2000: 6), we suggest that recent work in philosophical aesthetics, particularly the Aesthetic Creation Theory proposed by philosopher Nick Zangwill (2007) in his book Aesthetic Creation, has the potential to redress this imbalance. The wider field of philosophical aesthetics is concerned with the aesthetic appreciation of both works of art and our environment. While environmental philosophers like Arnold Berleant (1992) and Allen Carlson (2002) concentrate on our appreciation of the natural and vernacular environment, Zangwill primarily engages our appreciation of works of art. Zangwill’s theory is an aesthetic theory of art following Monroe Beardsley (1958/1981), whose book Aesthetics is the first systematic and critically informed philosophy of art in the analytic tradition (cp. Wreen 2014). Other proposals have been made, on the one hand, by Arthur Danto (1964), who first proferred an institutional theory of art in which members of the artworld, such as curators, critics, and gal80 Journal of Landscape Architecture | 1- 2016 Downloaded by [Vera Vicenzotti] at 11:37 25 February 2016 lery owners, define what is to be considered as art. Aesthetic theories, on the other hand, focus on the characteristics of the work, rather than on the context in which the work was produced. Both our agenda and our approach, that is an emphasis on the essential role of aesthetics for a sounder theory and richer practice of landscape architecture, as well as our turn to analytic philosophy, tie in with previous work by authors from landscape architecture. For example, many studies have explored the aesthetics of gardens (Miller 1993; Ross 1985; 2001; Cooper 2006), but we suspect that the explicit restriction to ‘gardens’ may have hampered the reception of this work within broader landscape architectural discourse. Hoping to reach a wider audience, we are thus explicitly addressing the aesthetics of ‘landscapes’, which implies an exploration of the contributions that landscape architects make to urban renewal, development of new nature, work on infrastructure, flood defences, etc. Susan Herrington’s book On Landscapes has a similarly comprehensive understanding of landscape, using various theories and analytic approaches to explain the limitations and potential of landscapes. In one of her book chapters, she also deals with aesthetic experience (Herrington 2008: 111–130). Here, the author argues elegantly against evolutionary theories and the conflation of the aesthetic with the visual. Other seminal contributions to landscape architectural discourse, from Laurie Olin, Marc Treib, Jean Gillette, and (again) Susan Herrington, focus on the question of what gardens mean (Treib 2011). However, while questions of meaning and aesthetics are intimately linked, as Eva Gustavsson (2012) urges us to see, they are nevertheless distinct from one another. Our paper thus adds ‘to a conversation that is endlessly ongoing’ (Gillette 2011: 171), recommending a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between meaning and aesthetics. It is precisely here, in thinking through the structure of aesthetic theories, that we believe turning to the philosopher Zangwill could be fruitful because Zangwill emphasizes_in the tradition of analytic philosophy_ clarity, rigour, argument, theory, and truth. The landscape architectural discourse of recent years has tended to eschew ideas of aesthetics. We believe that this is partly a consequence of the structure of older theories of art. Zangwill’s Aesthetic Creation Theory allows us to see landscape architecture (again) as an art, but without the lofty pretensions of art for art’s sake. Zangwill’s theory holds that works of art have aesthetic functions, which are essential to them, but also allows that they have other, non- aesthetic functions, such as practical or ecological ones. Aesthetic Creation Theory focuses on the creation side of art, which is why it is called Aesthetic ‘Creation’ Theory. While this is not unproblematic for an understanding of landscape architecture that wishes to consider its users, it may tie in with what Gillette (2011: 172) refers to as the New Aestheticism, a recent shift ‘from theories that validate the user towards arguments that validate the maker of the artefact’. The point of our paper, however, is not to prove that landscape architecture is intrinsically an art and only an art_if one understands art as being fine art. Neither do we believe that Zangwill’s theory holds the key to all questions within the aesthetical discourse in landscape architecture. We advance it in a spirit of experimentation, asking several questions: How far can the theory be taken? How good is Aesthetic Creation Theory as an explanation for what happens when landscape architects design landscapes? What are its implications for landscape architecture? But, most importantly, we assert that theorizing landscape architecture as a practice that strives for the creation of aesthetic values (alongside other values), provides a richer and more truthful account of the discipline. Art and design A distinction has often been made between the fine arts, such as painting, sculpture, music, and poetry (and latterly new forms like conceptual art, film, photography, and printmaking), and the applied or practical arts, such as furniture making, industrial design, glass-making, metalwork, ceramics, embroidery, and so on (Kristeller 1978; Herrington 2007: 307). Nowadays, gardening and landscape architecture are seldom viewed as art (Scruton 1979: 5; Winters 2007: 4). In fact, the entire debate around high art versus low art may sometimes seem obsolete, especially with regard to landscape architecture. Indeed, neither practitioners nor scholars within the field use these phrases very often. However, first, we would argue that framing the discourse through the lens of this dichotomy and showing how it is overcome within Zangwill’s Aesthetic Creation Theory may help to understand the reasons why landscape architecture has eschewed aesthetics, as well as how to move beyond this tendency. Second, the legacy of the high art / low art debate still informs, explicitly or implicitly, some strands within landscape architecture theory discourse. On the one hand, David Cooper (2006: 25) asserts, for example, that some gardens could certainly be con1- 2016 | Journal of Landscape Architecture 81 Downloaded by [Vera Vicenzotti] at 11:37 25 February 2016 Aesthetic creation theory and landscape architecture Rudi van Etteger, Ian H. Thompson, Vera Vicenzotti Figure 1 Aesthetic qualities have obviously been relevant for the design of the High Line Park in New York City, created by James Corner’s firm Field Operations. sidered art and that the artworld and the garden-world overlap. Similarly, would ‘“underdetermine” the final product’, as Zangwill argues accordGeoffrey Jellicoe writes in the opening sentence of his introduction to The ingly (Zangwill 2007: 148, original emphasis). Strong functionalism, on the Landscape of Man: ‘The world is moving into a phase when landscape de- other hand, holds that aesthetics are simply irrelevant to landscape pracsign may well be recognized as the most comprehensive of arts’ (Jellicoe & tice. The point of landscape architecture, according to this view, is to proJellicoe 1975: 7). On the other hand, Ian Thompson (2000: 73–89) has shown duce landscapes that function and perform well, for instance, in an ecologthat only a small number of landscape architects believe that landscape ical sense, with no thought given to their appearance. This attitude can be architecture should aspire to be a fine art, with a much larger group navi- said to inform, for instance, some of the programmatic writings of Landgating by the beacon of ‘good design’, a position which would place land- scape Urbanism (cp. Herrington 2010: 8; Thompson 2012: 12). Strong funcscape architecture in the applied arts category. tionalism, however, is at odds with the way most landscape architects see Theorizing landscape architecture as an art should, however, not be their work (compare the definition of landscape architecture provided by seen as an attack on functional design; we are all in favour of designed ECLAS 2014; Kapper & Chenoweth 2000) and how they practice it. To assume landscapes that are aesthetically attractive and serve practical purposes. that aesthetic concerns were irrelevant, for instance in the design of a proHowever, we do take issue with the doctrine of functionalism in its weak ject like the High Line Park in Manhattan by James Corner’s office Field or strong forms. Weak functionalism states that good aesthetics will come Operations_one of Landscape Urbanism’s flagship projects_is utterly about automatically by producing functionality. However, as several au- unsatisfactory (Figs. 1 & 2). thors have pointed out (Pye 1978; Scruton 1979: 38; Winters 2007: 47), functionality does not determine form. The need to meet functional criteria alone 82 Journal of Landscape Architecture | 1- 2016 Downloaded by [Vera Vicenzotti] at 11:37 25 February 2016 Figure 2 The train tracks of the High Line no longer serve any functional purpose, but do add to the distinctive quality of the project. Zangwill’s Aesthetic Creation Theory Aesthetic creation theory as rational explanation Art theory is often in the position of having to catch up with, and account reasons and with intentions, and in this sense they are functional objects for, developments in practice. So-called formalist theories of art were a re- (Zangwill 2007: 98). Of course, it is important to remember that not all arsponse to the arrival of abstract modernism. Arthur Danto’s institutional tefacts are works of art. Starting from the question of why we produce art, theory, further developed by George Dickie (1974; 1984), was a response to Zangwill proposes that we do so because artworks provide us with pleasurworks by Duchamp and Warhol, who appropriated everyday objects and able experiences. These pleasurable experiences are of a special kind_they somehow turned them into art. The driving force of these developments, are aesthetic pleasures. Aesthetic pleasures are, following Kant, distinct in theory, is extensional; that is, they attempt to (re)cover all of the objects from the pleasures of emotional well-being, existential insight, intellecconsidered as art. Zangwill rejects these extensional theories in favour of tual clarity, or the fulfilment of some sensual appetite. Zangwill means by a theory of rational explanation; that is, a theory that makes our interest this a pleasure that is ‘derived from making or contemplating particular in art intelligible (Zangwill 2007: Chapter 1). Thus, he offers a theory that works of art’ (Ibid.: 25). A landscape-related example would be the pleasure describes, but moreover explains, the practice of art. This may not deliver we feel, for instance, if we contemplate a particular garden scene that feaa theory which meets all extensional demands but it explains why we pro- tures, say, a red-leaved tree in autumn against a clear-blue sky and enjoy duce art and why we care about art. Zangwill’s is a theory in the sense that the sound of its leaves rustling in the wind. Zangwill emphasizes that even it offers a framework under which we can assess landscape architecture as though the aesthetic pleasure is of a special kind, it is nevertheless pleasan art (Deming & Swaffield 2011: 32-33). ure. And the ‘pursuit of pleasure is an intelligible and rational pastime’ Zangwill starts by stating that artworks are artefacts_they are made (Ibid.: 11). The point of art is to provide these kinds of experiences (Ibid.: 98–99). by human beings. Human beings do not produce objects randomly, but for 1- 2016 | Journal of Landscape Architecture 83 IR. A. KEMPENAAR Downloaded by [Vera Vicenzotti] at 11:37 25 February 2016 Aesthetic creation theory and landscape architecture Rudi van Etteger, Ian H. Thompson, Vera Vicenzotti Figure 3 The lower part of the garden of the Villa Lante in Bagnaia, Italy: Its constricted and rigid appearance is due to the symmetry of its design, which rests, in large part, on the straight lines of the box-hedges. Aesthetic properties and aesthetic dependence Zangwill’s Aesthetic Creation Theory proposes that ‘[s]omething is a work When we call something ‘beautiful’ we have grounds for making that evaluof art because and only because someone had an insight that certain aes- ation. One may not consider the lower part of the garden at the Villa Lante thetic properties would depend on certain non-aesthetic properties; and to be beautiful but, instead, constricted and rigid; that attribution would because of this, the thing was intentionally endowed with some of those then rest on the symmetry of the design, in turn resting on the straight aesthetic properties in virtue of the non-aesthetic properties, as envisaged lines of cut box-hedges (Fig. 3), particularly in contrast with the more freein the insight’ (Ibid.: 36). flowing forms of trees in the upper part of the garden. ‘Verdictive properTo understand this complex sentence, one needs to understand the dis- ties depend on substantive aesthetic properties. Something may be beautinction Zangwill makes, building on work by Frank Sibley and others (for tiful in virtue of being graceful’ (Ibid.: 38). Zangwill further states that the example, Goldman 1990; Sibley 2001), between aesthetic and non-aesthetic aesthetic properties depend, or supervene upon, these non-aesthetic propproperties, and also the way he believes them to be related: ‘Aesthetic erties (Zangwill 2001). ‘Supervenience’ is a key term in Zangwill’s theory. It properties may be purely verdictive or evaluative properties, such as beauty is ‘best characterized in terms of the existence of necessities running from and ugliness, or aesthetic merit and demerit, if indeed these are different non-aesthetic to aesthetic properties’ (Zangwill 2007: 37). However, the aesfrom beauty and ugliness. Aesthetic properties also include substantive thetic properties depend upon non-aesthetic properties in a non-straightaesthetic properties, such as elegance, daintiness, balance or frenzy. Non- forward manner; there is ‘dependence without laws’ (Ibid.: 38, Footnote 1; aesthetic properties include physical properties, such as shape and size, Sibley 2001: 46; Goldman 1995: 136). This means that there is no set of nonand secondary qualities, such as colours and sounds’ (Zangwill 2007: 37; see aesthetic properties which necessarily leads to certain aesthetic properTable 1). Talk about aesthetic properties means much more than just beauty ties; but, on the other hand, certain non-aesthetic properties do seem to or even prettiness; rather it also includes ugliness, as well as the manifold exclude certain aesthetic properties (Zangwill 2007: 37; 83). A landscape derange of substantive aesthetic properties. sign-related example might be as follows: a garden, like the lower part of It is important to understand how aesthetic and non-aesthetic proper- Villa Lante, consisting entirely of straight lines and geometrical shapes ties are related. Some people might wonder how landscape architects can (as non-aesthetic properties) could not be naturalistic (as a substantive bring into being aesthetic properties, like for example elegance in a design. aesthetic property), but conversely, not all irregular plantings are necesOne cannot simply add five metres of elegance, or something like ten cubic sarily naturalistic. Also, even though the non-aesthetic properties do not metres of beauty, into the specifications or bill of quantities when build- change, the aesthetic properties might change over time, due to changes ing a garden, yet we can evaluate the resulting garden as elegant and there- in our value systems. The straight lines of the French formal gardens were fore beautiful. interpreted differently after the advent of the more irregular English landscape style. What had seemed controlled and well maintained suddenly seemed strained and manicured. 84 Journal of Landscape Architecture | 1- 2016 Downloaded by [Vera Vicenzotti] at 11:37 25 February 2016 Table 1 Aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties according to Aesthetic Creation Theory (Zangwill 2007: 37-38; 61; 82; 100) Figure 4 Chatsworth landscape park by Lancelot ‘Capability’ Brown in Derbyshire, England Insight and intention Two more key ideas in Zangwill’s theory are ‘insight’ and ‘intention’ (Ibid.: depended upon a smoothness of texture and the presence of certain qual39–45). For an artefact to be a work of art, the designers have to have the in- ities of curve (Fig. 4). He believed that if he could create such curves and sight that certain aesthetic properties depend upon certain non-aesthet- surfaces, the result would be beautiful. He was, in fact, in possession of ic properties. They must believe that if they produce these non-aesthetic the technical skill to be able to create these non-aesthetic qualities and in properties, the aesthetic properties will also be realized. ‘Insight’ must be doing so he brought into being a work of art. Similarly, landscape gardendistinguished from ‘idea’. An insight happens to a particular person. An er Humphry Repton predicted the aesthetic visual effects of his proposals idea is something that can be shared between persons. ‘Ideas are public, to his clients in the form of Red Books (so named for their red bindings), insight is personal’ (Ibid.: 44). which contained his observations on the present state of a client’s propIf the designers form the intention to realize the aesthetic properties erty and his recommendations on how it might be improved (Figs. 5 & 6). in virtue of the non-aesthetic properties, based upon the original insight, and if they are able to realize the aesthetic properties through producing On meaning and multi-functional art the relevant non-aesthetic properties (Ibid.: 40–41), the resulting artefact Zangwill admits that his theory might be thought old-fashioned in its rewill be a work of art. Once again, to give an example from landscape ar- enthronement of beauty as the goal of artistic creation_though he qualifies chitecture: ‘Capability’ Brown had the insight that a beautiful landscape ‘beauty’ with the phrase ‘and other valuable aesthetic properties’ (Ibid.: 11). 1- 2016 | Journal of Landscape Architecture 85 SPECIALE COLLECTIES, WAGENINGEN UR LIBRARY Aesthetic creation theory and landscape architecture Rudi van Etteger, Ian H. Thompson, Vera Vicenzotti Downloaded by [Vera Vicenzotti] at 11:37 25 February 2016 Figure 5 A ‘before’ picture from one of Humphry Repton’s famous Red Books shows the state of his client’s estate before improvement. Figure 6 The corresponding ‘after’ picture shows Repton’s suggestions for how to improve the estate. In his drawing, Repton evokes certain aesthetic qualities, which are to be reached by changing selected non-aesthetic properties: a manor house, the clearing of a lawn, the rearrangement of groups of trees, etc. Beauty lost its primacy during the rise of avant-garde work in the twenti- We limit ourselves here to a short account of Zangwill’s counterarguments eth century, and many might say that it is still a difficult concept to apply to those types of art theory that are most relevant to landscape architecto contemporary conceptual art, where the emphasis is not on aesthetic ture, namely institutional theories and audience theories. properties but on meaning. Zangwill, however, thinks that ‘almost all conInstitutional theories work well at a sociological level, but less so philoceptual art also has significant aesthetic aspirations’ (Ibid: 63) and he cites sophically. In Dickie’s formulation, an artwork is any artefact (including Robert Smithson’s Spiral Jetty (much admired in landscape architectural found objects) which has been accepted as such by the artworld (Dickie 1974, circles) as an example of a work which ‘has plenty of formal aesthetic val- 1984). Prominent members of the artworld, such as gallery owners, curaues’ (Ibid.: 62). He feels that even in cases where the aesthetic is not the tors, publishers, producers, and critics, have the appropriate authority to most important aspect of the work ‘it is still important and indeed essen- ‘christen’ these pieces as works of art. These ‘passing-the-buck’ theories are tial that the meanings of works are embodied in aesthetically significant extensionally successful, in that they cover all works that we consider to ways’ (Ibid.: 63). be art, including the hard cases like Fountain by Duchamp (Lopes 2014: 52). For Zangwill, meaningfulness and beauty are not mutually exclu- Zangwill (2007: 160–166) rightly criticizes these theories for their lack of sive properties in art, but neither do they necessarily belong together. He explanatory power; they offer no account of the ‘qualities’ that might inwrites that ‘a work of art can have aesthetic values that depend on the terest a gallery director or a critic in the first place. While garden history meaning of the work, and aesthetic values need not be the only values of has its own share of hard cases, probably most clearly illustrated by Mara work’ (Ibid.: 172). tha Schwartz in The Bagel Garden (cp. Herrington 2008: 1), we try here first to develop a theory for the majority of landscape designs. Some rival theories This brings us back to aesthetic theories, of which Aesthetic Creation Zangwill identifies his theory as an aesthetic theory of art, but not all Theory is a version. Zangwill builds upon Beardsley’s theory that art’s theories of art are aesthetic theories. In established philosophical aesthet- function is to produce aesthetic experiences. Beardsley argued that works ics, theories of art fall into five categories: imitation theory, expression of art were ‘intentionally endowed with a disposition to produce experitheory, formalist theory, institutional theory, and aesthetic theory (Car- ences (in an audience)’ (Ibid.: 127), but this is where Zangwill parts comroll 1999); there are variations of these, but these are the main types. The pany with him. The whole of Chapter 6 in Aesthetic Creation is devoted to shortcoming of the established theories, according to Zangwill, is that they arguments against audience theories: ‘a theory of what art is should not are all extensional theories; for example, they try to cover all the objects invoke any essential relationship to an audience’ (Ibid.). Zangwill’s theory intuitively classified as art (Zangwill 2007: Chapter 1), and they essentially is an ‘artist theory’ rather than an ‘audience theory’. This is not to deny the involve a relation to an audience (Ibid.: Chapter 6). That there are compli- importance of an audience, but ‘a way of emphasizing artistic autonomy_ cations when looking at landscape architecture as an art under all of these a lack of concern for others in making art’ (Ibid.: 147, original emphasis). rival theories has been shown by Mara Miller (1993) and Thompson (2000). 86 Journal of Landscape Architecture | 1- 2016 Downloaded by [Vera Vicenzotti] at 11:37 25 February 2016 Figure 7 Dangerous beauty_we can take aesthetic pleasure in scenes of environmental destruction. This is the former Magnasite Works, near Hartlepool, County Durham, England, where magnesium used to be extracted from seawater. Congruencies and virtues of Aesthetic Creation Theory for landscape architecture theory Dissolution of high art / low art distinction Zangwill’s theory has the virtue of removing the division between the fine experience for its own sake. Zangwill emphasizes this point because he reand the decorative arts, which means that the products of designers are jects instrumentalist theories of art (Zangwill 2007: 12). The pleasure we pereligible to be considered as art (Ibid.: 50, 75–78). He states that it is necessary ceive when contemplating works of art can be, but is not necessarily only, for the work of art to have an aesthetic goal (and landscapes indeed offer a means to an end, for example to raise environmental awareness. This is abundant aesthetic properties) but it need not be the ‘only’ goal. Designs not to deny that the aesthetic experience of nature cannot enhance this for larger landscapes often include areas with specific functions, such as awareness, but this consequence is not a (theoretically) necessary implicastoring water or providing habitats, but as long as the design also has spe- tion of aesthetic features. This is why we can still take aesthetic pleasure in cific aesthetic intentions, it can still be considered a work of art. scenes that show environmental destruction (Fig. 7), such as the ‘strange, Anne Whiston Spirn (1984) and Catherine Howett (1987) attempted, toxic beauty of rainbow-colored water polluted by acidic mine drainage at twenty years ago, to build ‘conceptual bridges between aesthetics and eco- a coal mine, the site of AMD Park in Vintondale, PA, USA’ (Meyer 2008: 8). logical design’ (Meyer 2008: 8), arguing that art, sustainability, and functionality were not mutually exclusive. Our interpretation of Zangwill’s theory The production of aesthetic qualities is meant to support contributions in this spirit, which strive to counter au- Aesthetic Creation Theory is not dogmatic about the way that aesthetic thors who, to paraphrase Elizabeth Meyer (Ibid.), do not think that beauty properties are produced. This means that it can accommodate aspects of matters. However, relying on Zangwill instead of Danto (as does Meyer) other aesthetic theories. It can relate both to the meaning of Stourhead might lead to a less instrumental understanding of the aesthetic dimen- for an educated audience revelling in references to the Aenean story (Hersion of landscape. While experiences of landscapes can indeed be ‘vehicles rington 2008: 74) (Fig. 8), and to that part of the audience which, for infor connecting with, or caring for, the world around us’ (Ibid.: 18), we agree stance, relates to the colourful display of the tulip tree in autumn. So, a with Zangwill that there is a certain value in acknowledging the aesthetic landscape designer is free to draw inspiration from the natural world, to 1- 2016 | Journal of Landscape Architecture 87 Downloaded by [Vera Vicenzotti] at 11:37 25 February 2016 Aesthetic creation theory and landscape architecture Rudi van Etteger, Ian H. Thompson, Vera Vicenzotti Figure 8 Knowing the meaning of a garden scene can add layers to the aesthetic experience but is not a necessary condition for it_a visitor can still take aesthetic pleasure in the gardens at Stourhead, Wiltshire, England, even if the references to the Aenean story are lost on him or her. imitate jagged mountains, or to borrow from the typologies of cultivation. insights occur, and the execution of the design, during which these inThere is room for the expression of emotions or cultural meaning, such as sights are realized in the production of a work of art (Zangwill 2007: 45–46). the planting of a weeping willow or a sombre yew tree in a graveyard. All For this very reason, Aesthetic Creation Theory can also help us to distinthat is needed for this to count as art is that the designer has had aesthetic guish the ownership of ideas within the cooperative production of design. insights and intentions to realize the aesthetic properties in virtue of the Zangwill writes that ‘[a]esthetic creativity or talent might be defined as non-aesthetic properties. Zangwill’s position is also generous in allowing the capacity to envisage non-actual things that would have a high degree for aesthetic qualities other than just beauty (Zangwill 2007: 39), offering of aesthetic value’ (Ibid.: 44). As his theory differentiates between insight room, for instance, for the sublime as provided by the work of Latz and Part- and idea and because the originating insight is experiential, it should alners in Duisburg-Nord (Figs. 9 & 10) (cp. Herrington 2008: 78). ways be clear who owns the idea behind the design_it is the person who At this point, some landscape architects may conceivably object and say experienced the original insight. However, as landscape architecture histhat they have never had these kinds of insights while designing. Zang- tory shows, one designed garden can embody insights from more than one will, however, maintains that the insights need not be expressed in words, person, in which case we could say that the work of art is a genuine colnor even be conscious (Zangwill 2007: 49). The photographer Lewis Hine laboration. Very often, in the sorts of collaborative projects undertaken by pointed to this feature of the inexpressibility of insights when he said: landscape architects, the other collaborators will be people like ecologists, ‘If I could tell the story in words, I wouldn’t need to lug a camera’ (Hine engineers, or foresters, who might not see the creation of aesthetic qualiquoted in Sontag 1977: 145). The aesthetic insight must be there, but it does ties as any part of their role and, thus, not form (and follow) aesthetic innot need to be made verbally explicit by the designer or artist. The insight sights and intentions. might, as Zangwill says, come forth in the drawing. It can be produced in Some designed landscapes (for example, the gardens at Stowe) have had the activity of sketching. ‘One can think in acting and making’ (Zangwill many owners and several designers. In such a case, new works of art have 2007: 45; cp. Moore 2010). In landscape architecture the aesthetic intentions been made upon the same site as the old, though traces of the former work are typically very clear, sometimes much clearer than any ideological in- may still be appreciated. tent. They are expressed in terms of drawings and written explanations of the design made before execution. Although Zangwill would generally not Aesthetic Creation Theory and the education of landscape architects set much store in what artists say about their work (Zangwill 2007:49; cp. A clear field of congruency between Zangwill’s theory and the praxis of Herrington 2011: 209), drawings are reasonable indicators of the landscape landscape architecture is in the development of a capacity for aesthetic inarchitect’s aesthetic intentions. sight. In the discipline it is built up by studies in the field by students and One of the objections to considering architects and designers as art- practicing landscape architects and through the study of projects which ists is that they do not, as a rule, create their works with their own hands. have been illustrated and described. Field trips form part of the education They produce drawings and specifications, which are then interpreted by of landscape architecture students, while the fieldwork included in their builders and other contractors who execute the works on site. Aesthetic studio projects can be understood as an exploration into the relationship Creation Theory tames this objection by making a distinction between the between non-aesthetic and aesthetic properties (Fig. 11). The non-aesthetessential creative phase, the process during which the essential aesthetic ic properties can sometimes be studied more clearly, and certainly more 88 Journal of Landscape Architecture | 1- 2016 Downloaded by [Vera Vicenzotti] at 11:37 25 February 2016 Figure 10 Sublime aesthetic experiences in the Duisburg-Nord Landscape Park Figure 9 Zangwill’s theory allows for other aesthetic qualities than just beauty, for example experiences of the sublime in the Duisburg–Nord Landscape Park, Germany. easily, in representations like maps and aerial photographs, but it is in the field that the aesthetic properties become apparent. Insights into the relationship between non-aesthetic and aesthetic properties can also be developed in the bureau excursions that many professional offices undertake. In the book Distance and Engagement produced by the Vogt office (Foxley & Vogt 2010) we find a description of the exploration of non-aesthetic and aesthetic qualities in trips taken by the office to the Burren in Ireland and to the engineering works of Vauban in France. Foxley and Vogt (2010: 265–266) write that [t]he enormous potential for Vauban’s fortifications to inspire landscape architecture remains’. And indeed, in their subsequent design for the European Harbour in Bremen, for example, the stage-like steps are reminiscent of Vauban’s fortifications (Fig. 12). In a high-pressure commercial environment, such excursions might be considered a luxury, or something peripheral to the main business of the office, but Aesthetic Creation Theory makes understandable why such activities are not trivial and why they need to be taken seriously, not just by practitioners, but also by scholarly researchers. Another prevalent practice, the activity of sketching, also makes good sense within the framework of Aesthetic Creation Theory. In this light, the investigation of different characteristics of a site and possible solutions to a brief can be characterized as an exploration of sets of non-aesthetic properties and the aesthetic properties which they support. Frequently, both map drawings and small perspective sketches will be produced. Whereas the former often represent sets of non-aesthetic properties, the perspective sketches regularly seek to capture the aesthetic experiences to be had. Aesthetic Creation Theory could help further in landscape architecture education by showing students how to deal with a brief, and making clear to them that a brief still leaves room for artistry, since it never determines all design choices. Social factors, client’s wishes, and programmatic constraints ‘underdetermine the final product’ (Zangwill 2007: 148, original emphasis). In the ‘residual space’ the designer can act out his or her ‘freedom’ (Ibid.: 150) and realize ‘artistic autonomy’ (Ibid.: 147). Aesthetic Creation Theory for critics Zangwill’s theory also has consequences for the evaluation of designs. Before implementation of a work of landscape architecture there are plans and drawings. In the light of Aesthetic Creation Theory, these drawings are not just there to prescribe the non-aesthetic properties of the work, but can also be used to predict aesthetic effects. This is the moment for reflection on whether these effects are desirable and whether the proposed nonaesthetic properties will give rise to them as predicted by the perspective drawings. After production of the work, judgments can be made about the extent to which the intended effects have been realized. With its emphasis on aesthetic intentions, Aesthetic Creation Theory provides the theoretical basis for differentiating between aesthetic properties that are the result of deliberate design intentions on the one hand and any accidental developments within the landscape that were not part of the original intention on the other. A complication: the position of the audience As mentioned above, Aesthetic Creation Theory is not an audience-based theory; rather, it focuses on the creation of art. For landscape architects, who are generally taught that their work must meet the needs of users, this may seem a strange, even off-putting, position, so it needs some further explanation and qualification. In landscape architecture there is clearly an audience (Ibid.: 145; footnote 15; Hunt 2004; Treib 2011). Similarly, there are often calls for the kinds of post-occupancy studies occasionally carried out on buildings to be undertaken for designed landscapes. None of this, however, is incompatible with Zangwill’s theory, nor does he ignore the audience or user side. Throughout his book, he attempts to make intelligible all of our art activities: why we value art, what it is that drives us to make and to behold it_ for example, both the production and consumption of art (Zangwill 2007: 1). However, his theory is, in a sense, a bare-bones account of the essence of art (Ibid.: 159). (It is fair to add here that we are not all equally convinced by Zangwill’s bare-bones essentialism and that some of us have previously 1- 2016 | Journal of Landscape Architecture 89 R. SCHRIJVER Aesthetic creation theory and landscape architecture Rudi van Etteger, Ian H. Thompson, Vera Vicenzotti Downloaded by [Vera Vicenzotti] at 11:37 25 February 2016 Figure 11 During field trips, students of landscape architecture are sensitized to the relationship between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties, training their capacity for aesthetic insight. Figure 12 The stage-like steps in the European Harbour in Bremen, Germany, designed by the Vogt office, 2007–2012, seem clearly inspired by the engineering works of Vauban in France (Foxley & Vogt 2010: 265f.). written from a non-essentialist position.) Thus, Zangwill (Ibid.: 140) ar- In this paper we have focused on explaining, in outlines, the basic features gues, the ‘minimum that we need for a rational explanation of the crea- of Zangwill’s theory and we have begun to demonstrate how it makes inteltion of art is the existence of the intention to realize valuable properties ligible the art-related practice of our discipline. We believe, however, that in the object or event’. Aesthetic Creation Theory also provides grounds for further developing However, while we have great sympathy for Zangwill’s elegant, mini- sound criticism of works of landscape design_a criticism that is informed malist, and consistent explanation of art, there is certainly the danger that by an assessment of the degree to which intended aesthetic experiences are his reasons for adopting an artist-centred approach may be ignored and realized through the physical design. While the aesthetic dimension is, of his argumentation misused to re-enthrone the designer and disempower course, not the only one to be considered, we think that the discipline needs the user. This is emphatically not our purpose. a critical approach which does justice to the complete nature of works of landscape architecture by taking aesthetics fully into account. Conclusions Furthermore, we believe that Aesthetic Creation Theory provides arguIn this paper, we have introduced Zangwill’s Aesthetic Creation Theory ments that may prove useful in various strategically relevant contexts. The into the landscape architecture discourse in an experimental spirit be- argument, for example, that human beings are able to enjoy aesthetic excause we are convinced that it has much to offer the discipline. It can con- periences and thus find it worthwhile to invest in them provides reasons tribute to redressing an imbalance in some strands in landscape architec- why certain jobs should be done by (or with) landscape architects, rather tural theory by recovering the aesthetic dimension; it does so by thinking than by engineers (alone). Furthermore, by explaining the role of the rethrough the structure of those aesthetic theories whose legacy we believe lation between non-aesthetic and aesthetic properties, the theory makes to be responsible for a sceptical, or even hostile, attitude towards aesthet- certain activities specific to landscape architects, such as extensive drawics from some within the field. Zangwill’s theory allows us to see landscape ing practice, bureau excursions, and field trips with students, intelligible. architecture (once again) as an art_yet without the lofty aspirations and Departments of landscape architecture often find themselves in a position pretensions of art for art’s sake and with the explicit possibility of con- of having to defend their resources for teaching and research activities that sidering useful aspects; for example, social inclusion or ecological perfor- can differ substantially from those of the more established disciplines. Bemance. We think that the insights provided can add to both substantive ing able to give an account of these and other idiosyncratic practices of the and procedural theory in landscape architecture (cp. Lang 1987) as they discipline as rational, may, we believe, prove extremely valuable in discusprovide knowledge on how creating aesthetic value might work and what sion with university deans and leadership boards. landscape architects can do to improve the aesthetic quality of their work. There are numerous links to existing studies, both within general land- Acknowledgements scape architecture theory and, particularly, in aesthetics. Some of these Vera Vicenzotti’s contribution to this paper was funded by a Marie Curie we could at least acknowledge, many others had to remain implicit, but Intra European Fellowship within The Seventh European Community surely all are worth exploring in future research. We welcome any philo- Framework Programme under grant agreement n°328787. sophically sound critique of Zangwill’s theory, or our interpretation of it, that might help to better explain works of landscape architecture and their production. 90 Journal of Landscape Architecture | 1- 2016 References Beardsley, M. (1958/1981), Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 2nd edn. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.). Jellicoe, G. and Jellicoe, S. (1975), The Landscape of Man: Shaping the Environment from Prehistory to the Present Day (New York: Viking Press). Berleant, A. (1992), The Aesthetics of Environment (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press). Kapper, T. and Chenoweth, R. (2000), ‘Landscape Architecture and Societal Values’, Landscape Journal 19: 149–155. Carlson, A. (2000), Aesthetics and the Environment. The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture (London: Routledge). Kristeller, P. O. 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(2007), Architecture and Aesthetics (London: Continuum). Hunt, J. D. (2000), Greater Perfections: The Practice of Garden Theory (London: Thames & Hudson, Ltd.). Wreen, M. (2014), ‘Beardsley's Aesthetics’ [website], The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 edn.), E. N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/ beardsley-aesthetics/, accessed 02 May 2015 Hunt, J. D. (2004), The Afterlife of Gardens (London: Reaktion Books). International Federation of Landscape Architects (2003), ‘Definition of the Profession of Landscape Architect’ [website], IFLA News 48, http://issuu.com/ifla–publications/docs/ iflanews–48–july03>, accessed 05 May 2014 Rudi van Etteger is an Assistant Professor in Landscape Architecture at Wageningen University. He holds a Master’s degree in landscape architecture from Wageningen University and a Master’s degree in philosophy from the University of Utrecht. Currently, he is finishing his PhD on the aesthetics of designed landscapes. His research interests are theory and methodology of landscape architecture with an emphasis on aesthetics. Ian H. Thompson is Reader in Landscape Architecture at Newcastle University. He holds Bachelor’s degrees in philosophy and landscape design, and a Doctoral degree in landscape design, all from Newcastle University. He is the author of a number of books on landscape architecture theory including Ecology, Community and Delight (1999) and Rethinking Landscape (2008). Vera Vicenzotti is Senior Lecturer in Landscape Architecture, with a focus on design theory and architecture criticism, at SLU Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences in Alnarp. She holds a Doctoral degree in landscape architecture from the Technical University of Munich, Germany. Her research interests are, broadly speaking, theory, history, and methodology of landscape architecture. Contact Rudi van Etteger Wageningen University and Research Centre Gaia building Droevendaalse Steeg 3 Postbus 47 6700 AA Wageningen The Netherlands Phone: +31 (0) 317-483472 rudi.vanetteger@wur.nl Ian H. Thompson Newcastle University School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape Claremont Tower Newcastle University Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU United Kingdom Phone: +44 (0) 191-208-8812 i.h.thompson@ncl.ac.uk Vera Vicenzotti SLU Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences Department of Landscape Architecture, Planning and Management Box 58 230 53 Alnarp Sweden Phone: +46 (0) 40-405430 vera.vicenzotti@slu.se Zangwill, N. (2001), The Metaphysics of Beauty (New York: Cornell University Press). Zangwill, N. (2007), Aesthetic Creation (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 1- 2016 | Journal of Landscape Architecture 91